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PART I. INTRODUCTION
"Carnivore" entered the online world's collective consciousness in
June 2000 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation unveiled the Inter-
net surveillance software program to telecommunications industry
specialists.' The FBI claims the program allows agents to scan the traffic
of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for messages or commands to or
from a criminal suspect and then intercept only those messages, captur-
ing copies of e-mails, web site downloads and other file transfers.2
Reactions to Carnivore were immediate and frequently as vicious as
the program's moniker. Privacy advocates warned that the program
posed serious threats to the online privacy of law-abiding citizens, as it
created the potential for widespread monitoring of Internet traffic.3 Inter-
net Service Providers balked at the notion of an outside entity installing
a device, over which they would have no control, on their networks. An
oversight panel of the House Judiciary Committee convened a hearing
on Carnivore on July 24, 2000, during which committee members de-
manded that FBI officials prove that the software captures only those
messages pertaining to a criminal suspect and no others! The Senate
Judiciary Committee followed suit on September 6, 2000. Throughout
the debate, FBI officials have steadfastly maintained that deployment of
the program is sufficiently restricted by current law and internal reviews
to prevent misuse.'
A central issue in the controversy surrounding Carnivore is whether
current law permits the FBI to employ the program in the Internet con-
text. Bureau officials claim statutory authority for deployments under
1. Neil King Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2000, at A3.
2. Ted Bridis & Neil King Jr., Carnivore E-Mail Tool Won't Eat Up Privacy, Says FBI,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at A28.
3. See King Jr. and Bridis, supra note 1, at A3.
4. Nick Wingfield & Don Clark, Internet Companies Decry FBI's E-Mail Wiretap Plan,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 2000, at BI IA.
5. Ted Bridis, Congressional Panel Debates Carnivore As FBI Moves to Mollify Privacy
Worries, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at A24.
6. Id.
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three provisions originally enacted to regulate telephone surveillance-
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Title lI)7 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA)--and a statute governing retrieval of "transactional records" of
communications-the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (CALEA).' ° Title III governs the use of electronic surveil-
lance to capture the full content of communications, commonly referred
to as "wiretapping."" The ECPA is concerned with the use of "pen regis-
ter" devices-which traditionally allowed law enforcement officers to
record the telephone numbers dialed from a suspect's telephone' 2-and
"trap and trace" devices-which traditionally involved capturing the
originating telephone numbers of incoming calls to a criminal suspect,
like caller ID devices. 3 In a manner not entirely clear, FBI officials jus-
tify interception of e-mail addressing information under a conflation of
ECPA and CALEA.1
4
The FBI cites Smith v. Maryland5 for constitutional authority to em-
ploy the pen register and trap and trace functions of Carnivore. Smith
holds that telephone customers have no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the electronic impulses dialed and transmitted over telephone
lines to initiate a telephone call. 6 By analogy, Bureau officials assert that
they are entitled to obtain a court order to install Carnivore as a pen reg-
ister or trap and trace capable of intercepting the Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses and "To:" and "From:" fields of e-mals coming to or originat-
ing from a criminal suspect.
7
While the pen register and trap and trace functions are neither the
most controversial nor potentially invasive aspects of Carnivore, they are
at least the most legally contestable of its uses. The FBI's assertion of
constitutional and statutory authority to employ these functions on the
Internet are challenged by those who believe a pen register capturing IP
address and/or header information from e-mail messages falls outside
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. II 1996).
10. The 'Carnivore' Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the DigitalAge:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter "Senate
Hearing"] (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation),
available at http:lwww.senate.gov/-judiciary/962000_dmk.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994).
14. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Donald M. Kerr).
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the scope contemplated by the courts and Congress for pen registers."
This note explores this question, drawing on statutes and case law that
form the foundation of authority for electronic surveillance.
Part II provides a brief overview of the Carnivore system and its ca-
pabilities. Part III elaborates on the statutory and constitutional authority
for pen register and trap and trace devices'9 in the traditional telephone
context, as well as the legal requirements for obtaining a court order to
install such a device. Part IV analyzes the FBI's proposed justification
for Internet use and concludes that while constitutional authority exists
for pen register applications of Carnivore, statutory authority derives
from sections imposing higher evidentiary standards on law enforcement
than the pen register statutes. Part V recommends that Internet pen regis-
ter orders be issued only upon satisfaction of the stricter evidentiary
standard of 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
PART II. CARNIVORE AND ITS CAPABILITIES
Under pressure from both legislators and privacy advocates, the FBI
submitted Carnivore to independent expert review20 at the Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology Research Institute (IlTRI) and the Illinois Institute of
Technology Chicago-Kent School of Law. In response, the group issued
a draft report in November 2000, providing a complete description of the
Carnivore system's capabilities and limitations.2'
The Carnivore software program is installed on a general purpose
desktop computer, which is connected, without keyboard or monitor, to a
switch or hub at an ISP. 2 The computer receives all of the data "packets"
passing through the segment of the ISP's network to which it is at-
tached.' 3 The "collection computer" as this unit is called, is remotely
controlled by an FBI computer connected via telephone link by the
18. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy), available at
http:llxvwv.senate.gov/-judiciary/96200__pjl.htm.
19. Though differing slightly in function and statutory wording, the legal principles dis-
cussed apply in the same manner to both pen registers and trap and trace devices, which will
be referred to collectively as pen registers.
20. Bridis, supra note 5, at A24.
21. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INDEPENDENT TECHNI-
CAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: DRAFT REPORT, Nov. 17, 2000, available at
http:/lwww.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/camivoredraft_l .pdf.
22. Id. at vii-ix.
23. Id.
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commercially available PCAnywhere® software.24 All computers are
equipped with a Jaz® drive for removable data storage.2
The defining feature of Carnivore is its ability to "filter" a single
suspect's Internet traffic from among that of all users on a portion of the
ISP's network, and then capture (by making a copy of the data packets)
only those types of data authorized by court order." Using a relatively
simple Windows®-based interface, an FBI agent may set Carnivore to
capture data packets originating from or destined for a particular e-mail
or IP addresses, whether fixed or dynamically assigned.7 In wiretap
mode, the system can view the content of e-mails, Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP, or World Wide Web) pages, File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) sessions, or any other application protocols.2 In pen register
mode, the program can collect header information such as the "To:" and
"From:" addresses from e-mails and the IP addresses of computers in-
volved in FTP or HTTP transactions.29
Captured data packets are archived for analysis. A software program
called Packeteer® processes the raw output of Carnivore to reconstruct
the higher-level protocols (e.g., HTTP) from the data packets, each of
which represents only a small portion of any given message." The recon-
structed data is then analyzed by a program called CoolMiner®, which
develops statistical summaries and displays pen register or full content
information via an Internet browser.'
The IITRI report concluded that when used correctly pursuant to a
Title III wiretap order, Carnivore provides law enforcement officials with
no more information than is permitted by the court order.32 This success
depends, however, on the ability of the operating agent to properly con-
figure the filters.3 Even when correctly configured in pen register mode,
the IITRI report found that Carnivore collects "To:" and "From:" fields
from e-mail, as well as the length of messages and the length of individ-




26. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/Carnivore/Camivore2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
27. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at ix-x.
28. Id. at ix.
29. Id.
30. Id. at xii.
31. Id.
32. Id. atii.
33. Id. at xi.
34. Id. at xii.
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It is worth noting that Carnivore must scan every data packet travel-
ing the subnetwork it is monitoring in order to determine which to
capture and which to ignore. Those that pertain to the subject of investi-
gation are captured for additional filtering and storage, while the rest are
ignored.35 The IITRI report notes that while Carnivore is designed for
"fine-tuned searches," it is also capable of "broad sweeps."
36
PART III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR TRADITIONAL
PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE INSTALLATIONS
Federal law defines a pen register as "a device which records or de-
codes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is at-
tached. 37 A "trap and trace device" means "a device which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic
communication was transmitted?'
31
Law enforcement officials need not obtain a search warrant before
installing a pen register or trap and trace device. Federal law requires,
however, that an attorney for the government or a law enforcement offi-
cer apply for a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (1994) before
employing such a device.39 This application must include 1) the identity
of the attorney or officer making the application and the identity of the
law enforcement agency conducting the investigation, and 2) a certifica-
tion by the applicant (i.e. the applicant's assertion) that the information
likely to be obtained from the pen register or trap and trace is "relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency.',
When a proper application is submitted, the magistrate must issue an
order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and
trace device.4 The order must specify 1) the identity, if known, of the
person to whose telephone line the device will be attached; 2) the iden-
tity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the investigation; 3) the
telephone number and physical location of the telephone line and, in the
35. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Donald M. Kerr).
36. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 4-3;
"Incorrectly configured, Carnivore can record any traffic it monitors." Id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994).
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(a), 3122(a) (1994).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(l)-(2) (1994).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994) ("Upon an application made under section 3122 of this ti-
tle, the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register
or a trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court...... [emphasis added]).
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case of a trap and trace, the geographic limits of the order, and 4) a
statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained
relates.42
The statutory threshold for obtaining a pen register or trap and trace
order is low and easily met; however, even this standard is more than the
Constitution requires. In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
pen registers do not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, and thus require no search warrant or court authorization of any
type.4' The Court reasoned that telephone subscribers have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial; thus, those numbers fall
outside the Fourth Amendment's zone of protection." Applying the two-
prong expectation of privacy test established in Katz v. United States,45
the Smith Court held that a telephone subscriber cannot have a subjective
expectation of privacy in numbers dialed, for all telephone customers
know that the numbers they dial are revealed to and recorded by the
phone company in the normal course of business, both for connecting
their calls and for other purposes.46 Furthermore, even if a customer
oblivious to these facts entertained a subjective expectation of privacy,
the Court held that this expectation was not one society recognizes as
objectively reasonable.47 This result follows, the Court said, from the
doctrine that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in infor-
mation he voluntarily turns over to a third party (i.e. the telephone
company).4 1 Thus, when a telephone subscriber "voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that in-
formation to its equipment in the ordinary course of business," the
subscriber "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed."' 9
42. 10 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1994).
43. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46, (1979).
44. See id.
45. 389 U.S. 347, (1967). To determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a
communication, the Katz test asks two questions: 1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" in the communication, and 2)
whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable." Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
46. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43,
47. Id. at 743.
48. Id. at 743-44.
49. Id. at 744.
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PART IV. CURRENT LAW DOES NOT AUTHORIZE USE OF CARNIVORE
AS AN "INTERNET PEN REGISTER" TO CAPTURE E-MAIL
ADDRESSING INFORMATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3 123
The aforementioned statutes and constitutional principles are now
routinely applied to pen registers and trap and trace devices installed on
telephone lines. Over the last three years, the FBI and numerous courts
have applied them to Carnivore installations as well, authorizing the use
of the program as an "Internet pen register" to capture the "To:" and
"From:" fields on e-mail messages. While the FBI views telephone and
Internet pen registers as clearly analogous, and subject to the same
laws,5" others argue that the Bureau lacks legal authority to capture e-
mail addressing information in particular, because it is more revealing
than the numbers dialed on a telephone.5 ' Viewed from the standpoint of
how each type of information is used, Carnivore likely meets the consti-
tutional requirements for implementation of a pen register. Neither the
literal statutory language nor statutory construction, however, support the
application of ECPA to a pen register in the Internet context.
A. Carnivore Meets Constitutional Requirements
for Pen Registers
1. Carnivore Under Smith v. Maryland
The language of Smith v. Maryland makes it difficult to conclude de-
finitively whether Internet users hold any reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mail addressing information. If they do, a Carnivore pen
register order constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes and
law enforcement officials would be required to show probable cause to
obtain such an order.12 If no reasonable expectation exists, and e-mail
addressing information is analogous to telephone numbers, the FBI's use
of Internet pen registers without a showing of probable cause is proper,
from a constitutional law standpoint.53
a. Users Have No Subjective Expectation of Privacy
in E-mail Addressing Information
The primary difficulty in drawing the necessary analogy lies in the
Smith Court's exclusive focus on telephone pen registers. The Court's
50. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Donald M. Kerr).
51. Id. (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union), available at http:llwww.aclu.org/congress/1040600a.html (last visited Nov. 19,2001).
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
53. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
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rationale for determining that telephone subscribers hold no subjective
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial draws much of its
strength from the billing structure of the telephone industry. The Court
argued that because telephone subscribers know that the numbers they
dial are recorded by the telephone company for billing toll calls (i.e.,
their monthly bills list the numbers they called) and for applying special
rate structures, they also know that the telephone company can record
the numbers they dial. s4 Buttressing this argument are other characteris-
tics of how telephone systems use telephone numbers-subscribers
realize they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company for
purposes of completing their calls; devices recording telephone numbers
are frequently used to check billing operations, detect fraud and prevent
violations of the law; pen registers are used to determine whether a cus-
tomer is using a home phone to conduct a business; and recorded
telephone records are used to identify persons making annoying or ob-
scene calls.5 The Court concluded,
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that
the phone company does in fact record this information for a va-
riety of legitimate business purposes.... [I]t is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances,
harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret.56
The wording of this summary provides the strongest support for de-
nying that Internet users hold a subjective expectation of privacy in e-
mail addressing information. On the one hand, the billing structure of
ISPs, typically consisting of a flat monthly fee or a fee based on time
spent online, never considers the distance over which messages are sent.
Consequently, the recipient addresses of such messages play no part in
determining billing, and no itemized list of "numbers dialed" is received
by users to destroy an expectation of privacy. But when users send e-
mail messages, they certainly know that addressing information is being
"conveyed" to their ISP, if for no other reason than to route their mes-
sages to the, proper destination. Moreover, because e-mail is typically
stored on an ISP's server computer before it is read by a recipient, and
often remains there after reading, users know ISPs possess "facilities for
recording" e-mail addressing information. The recordability of e-mail
54. Id. at 742.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 743.
2001-20021
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addresses is further supported by the knowledge that e-mail, like all
Internet traffic, is composed of digital data that may easily be recorded
by any computer receiving it. And for many of the reasons articulated by
the Smith Court-particularly detecting fraud and identifying the source
of harassing or obscene messages-users likely expect their ISPs to oc-
casionally or regularly record the addressing information of certain
messages for "legitimate business purposes." Considering these auxiliary
functions of e-mail addressing, it is "too much to believe' 57 that Internet
users expect their addressing information to remain private.
b. Society Does Not Recognize an Objective Expectation
of Privacy in E-mail Addressing Information
Supposing arguendo, however, that an Internet user could somehow
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in her e-mail addressing in-
formation, the second prong of the Katz test remains to be satisfied-is
that expectation one that society is willing to recognize as objectively
reasonable? Omitting any discussion of competing social policies or
societal norms, the Smith Court answered this question in the negative in
the telephone context,59 based on the "assumption of risk" doctrine of
United States v. Miller6' The Smith Court interpreted Miller to stand for
the proposition that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.' The Miller Court
held that a bank depositor has no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy"' in
financial information "voluntarily conveyed to ... banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business. 6 2 Thus, explained the
Miller Court,
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Gov-
ernment.... [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is re-
vealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.6
57. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
58. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
59. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
60. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
61. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44).
62. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442).
63. Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
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With no discussion of the difference between financial records and
telephone numbers, the Smith Court analogized,
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed nu-
merical information to the telephone company and "exposed"
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching
equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modem
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
completed calls to the subscriber.64
Substituting the proper e-mail terms into this formula, it becomes
clear that e-mail addressing information revealed to no one other than an
ISP's equipment nevertheless falls squarely within the Miller assumption
of risk doctrine, as interpreted in Smith. Telephone numbers dialed and
e-mail addressing information serve the same legitimate business pur-
pose-both tell network switching equipment where to send the call or
message of the initiating party. The fact that no human being may ever
view the header information is of no consequence. When an Internet user
sends a message over an ISP's network, she has revealed the addressing
information to the ISP's equipment in the ordinary course of business,
and she assumes the risk that the ISP will reveal her addressing informa-
tion to the government. A Carnivore installation on the ISP network
simply facilitates this "revelation" by the ISP.1
5
2. Carnivore's Constitutional Challenges
Having established doctrinally that Internet users have neither a sub-
jective nor an objective expectation of privacy in e-mail addressing
information per Smith, one additional wrinkle casts some doubt on
whether Carnivore pen register installations are constitutional. The Smith
Court emphasized very clearly the importance that the limited function-
ality of a telephone pen register played in its opinion:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine
from the use of a pen register whether a communication
existed.... They disclose only the telephone numbers that have
been dialed-a means of establishing communication. Neither
the purport of any communication between the caller and the
64. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
65. Note that the revelation by the third party to the Government need not be voluntary.
The bank records disclosed in Miller were obtained by means of subpoenas duces tecum.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
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recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was
even completed is disclosed by pen registers.6
Two aspects of the Carnivore system raise concerns in light of this
qualification. First, recall that the IITRI Draft Report on Carnivore found
that the system collects more than simply addressing information from e-
mail. The report noted that when correctly configured in pen register
mode, Carnivore collects not only the "To:" and "From:" fields of tar-
geted e-mall messages, but also the length of the message and the length
of individual fields within those messages. 67 In fact, the system captures
the entire e-mail message and all of its fields (including the "SUBJECT"
line and contents of the message), but replaces each character in fields
other than "To:" and "From:" with an X.
6
1
Certainly this information reveals more than the analog to "numbers
dialed." While not revealing to law enforcement the subject of the mes-
sage, whether the message contains any illegal content, etc., it does
indicate "whether a communication existed" or "whether the call was
even completed" 69 Considering the Smith Court's solicitude over the lim-
ited nature of pen registers, this fact raises the question whether
Carnivore, in its current incarnation, fully meets the constitutional defi-
nition of a pen register, or moves closer to the content-collecting realm
of a full Title II wiretap.
The second potential constitutional problem with Carnivore is con-
tained in suggestions by some that e-mall addressing information itself is
more revealing of identity than mere telephone numbers.70 An e-mail ad-
dress typically consists of a username connected to a server name by
"@" (e.g., student@umich.edu). The username is typically assigned to
one individual for institutional e-mail accounts (e.g., university and
business), but may be used by multiple members of a single household in
the case of a private ISP account. In the institutional settings mentioned,
usernames are often assigned by a central authority and typically contain
some part of the user's proper name. Private ISPs typically permit cus-
tomers to choose their own usernames, within certain parameters. Very
frequently these usernames also contain variations on or parts of the cus-
tomer's proper name. Some ISPs allow individuals within a household
66. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
167 (1977)).
67. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at xii.
68. Id. at 4-3.
69. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
167 (1977)).
70. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy).
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using the same Internet access account to create their own unique user-
names.
With these characteristics in mind, it appears e-mail addressing in-
formation often does reveal more about the identity of the sender and
receiver than the ten simple digits of a telephone number. But one may
well question whether this fact is necessarily troublesome from a consti-
tutional standpoint. It is unclear whether an e-mail address more
accurately reveals the actual sender or recipient of an e-mail than does a
telephone number. For someone other than the owner named in the re-
cords of the telephone company or ISP to use either type of account,
access must be gained. For an e-mail account, this means the user must
be privy to the owner's password. However, e-mail accounts can typi-
cally be accessed from almost any geographic location. For a telephone
call, the user must gain access to the owner's actual home, where the
telephone line terminates. In either case, such access is most likely to be
had by other members of the owner's household. Indeed, access to both
telephones and e-mail accounts by multiple members of the same house-
hold is quite common. Thus, it is unclear whether e-mail addresses really
reveal that much more about the identity of message senders and recipi-
ents. With no particular guidance from the Smith Court as to how
important this factor is to its analysis, drawing conclusions about the
constitutional importance of the supposed revealing nature of e-mail ad-
dressing information would be an exercise in speculation.
Whether e-mail addresses themselves reveal too much information,
and thus any pen register use of Carnivore is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, is a policy question that will eventually require judicial or
legislative resolution. But it need not presently hinder the FBI's use of
the program. The problem of overcollection identified by the IITRI re-
port, however, may be a fatal constitutional flaw. From the standpoint of
information functionality, Carnivore appears to collect more information
than constitutionally authorized for a pen register. Unlike telephone
numbers and e-mail addressing information, the length of messages and
the length of individual fields within those messages is not regularly col-
lected for any legitimate business purpose. This is especially true in the
e-mail context-while a telephone company may legitimately record the
length of messages for billing purposes, an ISP has no reason to monitor
7 1. In the institutional settings of universities and business, e-mail accounts are typically
assigned to and used exclusively by one individual. E-mail addresses attached to these ac-
counts may, in many cases, accurately reveal the sender or recipient of a message, creating a
stronger argument for placing interceptions of messages originating from or destined for an
institutional e-mail server outside the scope of Smith.
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the length of e-mail messages.72 Particularly troublesome is Carnivore's
collection of the entire body of the message in "X" form. This surely
raises concerns that if the software can electronically "redact" a mes-
sage, perhaps it could also un-redact it, revealing the full contents. Short
of such an overt violation, the possibility exists that a glitch in the sys-
tem would prevent the redaction from occurring, with the same result. In
either case, the Carnivore system is collecting more than is constitution-
ally authorized by Smith, whether that information is then submitted to
electronic minimization or not. In light of the Smith Court's insistence
that pen registers may only collect the telephone numbers dialed, the
version of Carnivore reviewed by the IITRI team appears constitution-
ally unsound, and should not be authorized for use as an Internet pen
register.
To bring Carnivore into compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the
FBI must alter the program to eliminate the overcollection of data in pen
register mode. The ITRI report not only suggests that this is possible,
but provides two suggestions for how it might be accomplished.7' First,
the IITRI team recommended the FBI create two separate versions of
Carnivore-one for pen registers and one for full-content collection.74
Separation of the functions would serve two purposes; not only would it
allow the customization of the software to prevent overcollection, but it
would also eliminate the risk that the program would be accidentally
configured for full-content collection when only a pen register was au-
thorized.75 Second, the IITRI report provides suggestions for simple
software modifications that would prevent Carnivore from overcollecting
in pen register mode.76 The report goes so far as to name the specific in-
structions that should be captured for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) and Post Office Protocol (POP) e-mail systems.77 If these altera-
tions are made to the Carnivore software program, it will satisfy the
constitutional requirements elaborated in Smith.
72. The "length" of messages, by which is meant the length of various fields within a
message, including the content field, should be distinguished from the size of an e-mail file,
which ISP's do legitimately record to monitor individual usage of server space.
73. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at A-I.
74. Id.
75. Id. (noting that the side-by-side placement of the pen mode and full content mode





B. Carnivore Pen Register Installations Are
Not Authorized Under 18 U.S.C. § 3123
Doctrinally, a slightly modified Carnivore program would meet the
constitutional requirements of a pen register device. The Constitution is,
however, only the first hurdle law enforcement officers must cross before
a pen register installation is legally permissible. The applicability of fed-
eral statutes governing pen registers is far more questionable, as the
literal statutory language, congressional intent, and judicial decisions
concerning other communications technologies suggest the FBI's use of
Internet pen registers is not authorized by the ECPA, and thus should not
be available under the minimal evidentiary standard applicable to pen
register applications.
1. Carnivore Is Incompatible with the Literal Language of and
Judicial Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3123
The ECPA defined a pen register as a "device which records or de-
codes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is at-
tached "78 Carnivore, on the other hand, is attached to a hub or switch of
an ISP and monitors a portion of the ISP's overall traffic. 9 In pen register
mode, it intercepts not "numbers dialed," but e-mail addressing informa-
tion. 0 The dissonance between the statute's literal language and the
physical structure of Carnivore installations was noted in testimony be-
fore Congress and raised as an objection to the use of Carnivore as a pen
register or trap and trace device.81
The reality of a Carnivore installation does not coincide with the
plain textual definition of a pen register. Judicial interpretation of the
governing statutes in reference to two other technologies support this
conclusion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held in Brown v. Waddell2 that a digital display pager "clone," used by
law enforcement officers to intercept pages sent to a suspected drug
dealer, does not fall within the statutory definition of a pen register "in
the critical sense that it is not attached to a telephone line." A few weeks
later, the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia reached a similar result in In re Application of the U.S.A. for an
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994).
79. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at vii-ix.
80. Id.
81. Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore'Program: Oversight Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Robert Corn-Revere, Hogan & Hartson LLP), available at
http:llwww.house.gov/judiciary/CornO724.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
82. 50 F.3d 285, 290-291 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer.3
There the court found that use of a cellular telephone digital analyzer-a
device capable of intercepting the electronic serial number (ESN) and
telephone number of a particular cellular telephone, as well as the num-
bers dialed on that phone-was not governed by the ECPA's pen register
provisions because it was not attached to a telephone line."
2. Legislative Intent Indicates that Carnivore
is Not Authorized by § 3123
Beyond the literal language of 18 USC § 3127 and judicial interpre-
tation thereof, legislative intent also falls squarely on the side of limiting
pen registers exclusively to devices attached to telephone lines. In the
Glossary section of its report on ECPA, the Senate Judiciary Committee
defined both pen registers and trap and trace devices exclusively in rela-
tion to telephone applications: "Pen registers are devices that record the
telephone numbers to which calls have been placed from a particular
telephone.... [T]rap and trace devices ... record the numbers of tele-
phones from which calls have been placed to a particular telephone.""
The court in In re Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer further noted that
in other statutory provisions relating to telephone communications, Con-
gress encompassed "any types [sic] of wire, oral, or electronic
communications-regardless of whether the intercepting device was 'at-
tached' to a telephone line. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511."6 Thus, the court
concluded, the application of the ECPA's pen register provisions exclu-
sively to devices attached to telephone lines "cannot be assumed to be
inadvertent."" Likewise, the Brown court emphasized that the afore-
mentioned Glossary not only distinguishes between different types of
pagers, showing that Congress was well aware of the distinctive charac-
teristics of specific technologies, but also defines pen registers
separately, indicating a belief that they were distinct and merited tech-
nology-specific treatment." The totality of this evidence strongly
suggests that Congress envisaged pen registers solely in the telephone
context, and so limited the scope of the pen register statutes by its choice
of definitive and statutory language.
83. 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
84. In re Cellular Telephone DigitalAnalyzer, 885 F Supp. at 200.
85. S. RPT. No. 99-541, pt. 4, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3555, 3564.
86. In re Cellular Telephone DigitalAnalyzer, 885 F Supp. at 200.
87. Id.
88. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1995); see S. RP. No. 99-541, supra
note 85, at 9-10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3563-3564.
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3. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act Explicitly
Imposes a Higher Standard of Proof for Intercepting
E-mail Addressing Information
That Congress did not intend to extend the use of pen registers (and
the accompanying low standard of proof) to the e-mail context is perhaps
evidenced most clearly by its passage of another act-the 1994 Commu-
nications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Section 207 of
CALEA instituted two related changes that heightened protection of e-
mail addressing information. First, it amended statutes governing access
to transactional records to eliminate the ability of law enforcement offi-
cials to obtain, by serving a subpoena on an electronic communications
services provider, the "addresses on [a subscriber's] electronic mes-
sages "'s9 Section 207 then proceeded to create an "intermediate standard"
that law enforcement must meet before a court will issue an order au-
thorizing the acquisition of such addressing information.
The requirements for government access to "transactional records"
relating to electronic communications service (which includes e-mail
addressing information) are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703. CALEA sec-
tion 207(a) amended 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) by striking a clause that
previously allowed law enforcement officers to obtain records concern-
ing a subscriber's electronic communication service by serving a
subpoena on the service provider. The House Judiciary Committee ac-
knowledged that the change was motivated by its determination that
"transactional records from on-line communication systems reveal much
more than telephone toll records or mail covers " '9 Accordingly, the re-
vised statute allows law enforcement officers to access e-mail addressing
information by only three means: 1) a full search warrant based upon
probable cause, 2) consent of the subscriber or customer whose informa-
tion will be disclosed, or 3) a court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d).92
Section 207's second innovation was the creation of the "intermedi-
ate standard" for obtaining a § 2703(d) court order.9" Falling somewhere
between a subpoena and probable cause, the standard requires that such
an order "shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
89. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 31 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3489, 3511;
See also Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, § 207(a), Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (1994)).
90. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 31 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3511.
91. Id.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (1994).
93. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, § 207(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994).
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that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation."'
The intent behind the establishment of an intermediate standard was
to protect on-line transactional records against, in the Judiciary Commit-
tee's words, "'fishing expeditions' by law enforcement " '9
On its face, § 2703 applies well to Carnivore "pen register" installa-
tions. An ambiguous legislative history, however, complicates such a
conclusion. § 2703 is part of Chapter 121, entitled "Stored Wire and
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access' As
such, § 2703 would appear to apply only to "transactional logs" com-
piled by ISPs. Such logs consist of electronically stored records detailing
the totality of a subscriber's online activities-to and from whom she
sent and received e-mails, what web sites she viewed, what commercial
transactions she completed, etc. Supporting this narrow construction is
the House Judiciary Committee's expression of concern about law en-
forcement access to just such compilations of data.96
And yet there are plausible arguments that § 2703 applies to "real-
time" collection of transactional data as well. First, Congress may have
distinguished between the contents of communications and transactional
information by its choice of statutory language. § 2703(a) sets out when
a service provider may be required to disclose "the contents of an elec-
tronic communication, that is in electronic storage "'97 Likewise,
§ 2703(b)(2) describes situations in which providers of "remote comput-
ing services" must disclose an "electronic communication that is held or
maintained on that service."98 § 2703(c) and (d), however, do not so limit
the transactional records (including e-mall addressing information) pro-
tected by the intermediate standard. Instead, these latter sections speak
generally of instances when a provider of electronic communications
must disclose "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to
or customer of such service."99 This difference in statutory language, as
suggested by the court in In re Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer,
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (Supp. IV, 1998) (emphasis added).
95. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, supra note 89, at 31 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N.
at 3511.
96. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3497. ("Transactional records document-
ing these activities and associations are generated by service providers. For those who
increasingly use these services, this transactional data reveals a great deal about their private
lives, all of it compiled in one place")
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (1994).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (Supp IV 1998).
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"cannot be assumed to be inadvertent " '00 It may well reflect Congress'
wish to afford greater protection to transactional data (including e-mail
addressing information) without regard for when it was acquired.
A much stronger ground for holding § 2703 applicable to real-time
acquisition of e-mail addressing information is the questionable differ-
ence between "disclosure" of stored records and "interception" of
transactional data. The committee's concern, as previously noted, was
that law enforcement would gain access to entire transactional logs, from
which they could effectively recreate a subscriber's online activities
"without any judicial intervention."' ' CALEA therefore implemented the
"intermediate standard" of § 2703(d) to iricrease judicial oversight of
government access to such records.
A Carnivore installation enables the FBI to create just such a
transactional log itself, with the scope determined only by the remotely
controlled configuration of the system's filters. If authorized by a § 3123
pen register order, this record is created without any effective "judicial
intervention'" in just the way Congress sought to prevent with CALEA.
The data sets "disclosed" by an ISP and "intercepted" by Carnivore are
identical but for the owner (and controller) of the equipment by which
they are recorded. Thus, the only appreciable difference between acquir-
ing e-mail addressing information through a § 2703 "disclosure" and a
§ 3123 pen register "interception" is that the latter allows the FBI more
control with less oversight.
Allowing the FBI to construe § 2703 to permit such a result would
contravene the policy of heightened protection for transactional records
that Congress intended that section to serve. Principles of statutory con-
struction dictate that the executive branch may not administer a statute in
a manner inconsistent with the administrative structure Congress has
enacted in law." Thus, where the intent of Congress is clear (as it is with
§ 2703), both the courts and the agency are bound to give effect to that
intent. 4 It follows that Carnivore pen register installations, in which
"transactional records" in the form of e-mail addressing information are
to be obtained, may only be authorized under the intermediate standard
100. In re Application of the U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Tele-
phone Digital Analyzer, 885 . Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
101. H. R. REP. No. 103-827, supra note 89, at 19, reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. at
3497.
102. Recall that the court "shall enter" (18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994)) a pen register order
upon the requesting agent's certification that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation:' (18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (1994)).
103. 2 Am. JtnR. 2D Administrative Law § 525 (1994) (citing ETSI Pipeline Project v.
Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, (1988)).
104. Id. (citing K-mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) and ETSI Pipeline
Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
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of 18 U.S.C. § 2703. For courts to exempt such an activity from the
scope of § 2703, and instead authorize it under § 3123, contravenes con-
gressional intent with regard to § 2703.
One must immediately note the increased burden this places upon
FBI agents seeking Carnivore pen register orders. The ex parte order
issued for traditional pen registers, pursuant to which the FBI currently
deploys Carnivore in pen mode, requires only the law enforcement offi-
cial's certification that the "information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing investigation"' O5 Worded in
the mandatory ("the court shall enter an ex parte order"),' this provision
hamstrings the magistrate reviewing the order, as the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted: "This provision does not envision an independent ju-
dicial review of whether the application meets the relevance standard,
rather the court needs only review the completeness of the certification
submitted."'' 7
By contrast, a § 2703 order requires an actual statement of "specific
and articulable facts."'*' Moreover, the reviewing magistrate must deter-
mine (i.e. independently review) that these facts establish "reasonable
grounds" to believe the requested records are both "relevant and mate-
rial" to an ongoing investigation.' °9 Applied to a Carnivore installation in
pen mode, as seems appropriate from the discussion supra, § 2703 sig-
nificantly limits the circumstances in which the FBI can justify
implementation of a Carnivore pen register.
4. Carnivore Does not Meet the Minimization
Requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3121
Even if pen register statutes could be stretched to include Carnivore
installations, the program's current incarnation arguably violates the
minimization requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3121. That section, also added
by CALEA section 207, states, "A government agency authorized to in-
stall and use a pen register under this chapter or under State law shall use
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or de-
coding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling
information utilized in call processing."
The version of Carnivore tested by the IITRI researchers records not
only the "To:" and "From:" fields of e-mail messages, but also the length
of all other fields, capturing the full-text of messages and replacing text
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. S. REP. No. 99-541, pt. 4, at 47 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3601.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (Supp. II 1996).
109. Id.
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in all other fields with Xs." ° Remembering also the ITRI team's sugges-
tions for simple ways to eliminate collection of this additional
information,"' better technology is clearly "reasonably available" to limit
the data Carnivore captures to what is ostensibly "dialing and signaling
information:' If for no other reason than this alone, the FBI should not
be allowed to use the tested version of Carnivore as an Internet pen
register.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
The above analysis demonstrates that current law requires that the
FBI meet the "intermediate standard" (specific and articulable facts
showing reasonable grounds for believing information sought is relevant
and material) of 18 U.S.C. § 2703 to intercept e-mail addressing infor-
mation using the Carnivore system. Despite its claim of authority under a
conflation of the pen register standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (mere certifi-
cation that information is relevant to ongoing investigation) and the
§ 2703 standard,"2 the law dictates that federal courts not permit such
interceptions under the more lenient § 3123 standard.
State and federal law enforcement officials are constitutionally per-
mitted to intercept e-mail addressing information under Smith, Miller,
and Katz. Because such information is voluntarily conveyed to and may
be recorded by a third party-the sender's ISP-for legitimate business
purposes, Internet users may not claim either a subjective or an objective
expectation of privacy in that information. In this manner, the use pat-
terns of e-mail addresses and telephone numbers by both consumers and
service providers analogize well. The analogy is shattered by any collec-
tion of information in excess of the IP addresses and "To:" and "From:"
fields of e-mail messages, however. Such collection violates the Fourth
Amendment and must be eliminated from Carnivore's program to bring
it within constitutional limits.
Assuming this constitutional flaw in the program is remedied,"3
Carnivore nevertheless fails to satisfy federal statutory requirements for
a pen register order under the lenient standard of § 3123 for three rea-
sons. First, Congress explicitly removed e-mail addressing information
from the scope of § 3123 when it passed CALEA section 207, codified
110. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at xii,
4-2.
111. Id. atA-1.
112. Senate Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Donald M. Kerr).
113. And if the FBI truly desires to stay within constitutional bounds, there is no reason
why the problem shouldn't be fixed.
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in 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Second, Carnivore does not meet the statutory defi-
nition of a pen register in 18 U.S.C. § 3127, because it is not "attached to
a telephone line." Judicial interpretation of the pen register statute in re-
lation to other new technologies, as well as indicia of congressional
intent, support this conclusion. Finally, even if Carnivore could be con-
sidered analogous to a pen register under § 3127, the version tested by
IITRI collects more information (field and message lengths) than permit-
ted by a pen register order, violating the minimization requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 3121.
The requirements of § 2703 represent a reasonable standard for the
authorization of Carnivore interceptions of e-mail addressing informa-
tion. This standard balances the important competing social interests
implicated in Carnivore installations. On the one hand, it lends a meas-
ure of protection to the privacy of Internet users by requiring federal law
enforcement to come forward with specific facts that prove the necessity
of and justification for using such an intrusive technology, rather than
granting them access via the "rubber-stamp" standard of § 3123. On the
other hand, the standard does not erect such a high barrier to Carnivore
installations that law enforcement is prevented from using this indis-
putably effective technology to investigate very real and very serious
crimes. In the absence of further legislative direction, the § 2703 stan-
dard should be applied as the most legally and politically defensible
interpretation of existing law.
PART V. EPILOGUE: THE USA PATRIOT ACT
A. Introduction
On October 26, 2001, Congress enacted Public Law 107-56, the ac-
ronym-conscious Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001 [hereinafter Patriot Act]. Pushed quickly through
Congress in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Patriot
Act expanded the powers of law enforcement in an effort to combat ter-
rorist acts domestically and worldwide.1 4 Section 216 modifies the
restrictions on pen register and trap and trace installations."5 The provi-
sions of section 216 work a radical change in the law of pen registers, for
114. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
"Patriot Act"] ("An Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the
world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes:').
115. Seeid. § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-90.
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the first time explicitly expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127
(1994) to authorize pen register installations in the Internet context."
6
With the government's efforts currently focused on combating ter-
rorism, sections of the Patriot Act affecting the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1842) [hereinafter FISA] are also
likely to play an important role in the use of Internet pen registers. Sec-
tion 214 of the Patriot Act alters the language of FISA section 402 to
broaden the range of investigations in which pen registers may be em-
ployed to combat terrorism.' 7 Section 214 permits the use of pen
registers to monitor a United States person only so long as the investiga-
tion "is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment to the Constitution""8
The net effect of the changes wrought by sections 214 and 216 is to
statutorily legitimate and expand government monitoring of Internet traf-
fic in the same manner as telephone communications. The Patriot Act
resolves most lingering statutory questions as to whether a tool like Car-
nivore may be employed as an Internet pen register by expressly
including such applications in the relevant definitions and procedures.
One may still question, however, whether Carnivore pen register installa-
tions meet constitutional and minimization requirements if the device
continues to go beyond collecting "dialing, routing, addressing, and sig-
naling information""' 9 to also collect the X-redacted contents of e-mail
messages. This Epilogue briefly explains the effects of Patriot Act sec-
tions 214 and 216, and considers their implications for the legality of
Internet pen registers.
B. The New Face of Pen Register Law
1. Carnivore Moves Permanently onto the Internet:
Patriot Act Section 216
The provisions of section 216 most radically altered the existing law
of pen registers, and merit the most thorough examination. Section 216
not only redefined many key terms that explicitly expand the statute's
scope to include Internet pen registers, but also imposed record-keeping
116. See, e.g., id. § 216(b), 115 Stat. at 288-90 (including in nev 18 U.S.C.
§ 3123(a)(3)(A) specific requirements in relation to pen registers installed on packet-switched
networks).
117. See id. § 214, 115 Stat. at 286-87 (permitting pen registers for "any investigation to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities").
118. Id. § 214(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 286.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2001), amended by Patriot Act § 216(a)(2), 115 Stat. at 288.
120. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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requirements that create an "electronic paper trail" permitting after-the-
fact judicial oversight of the installation. Moreover, section 216 permits
law enforcement officials to cast a broad net by permitting the court or-
der to be served on any communications service provider whose
assistance is necessary to facilitate execution of the order.
As discussed in Parts JV.B.1-2, pen register law was previously ill
suited to accommodate Carnivore installations because its definitions
were cast in terms of telephone facilities and functions.' Courts were
largely unwilling to stretch those definitions to allow pen registers to be
utilized with non-telephone technologies.'2 As such, the statutory au-
thorization for Internet applications of Carnivore in pen register mode
was highly questionable.
Patriot Act section 216 lays those questions to rest by systematically
redefining pen registers in terms that encompass Internet applications.
Pen registers and trap and trace devices themselves now include any
"device or process" that captures, records or decodes "dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information" 3 rather than simply "the numbers
dialed" or "the originating number."'24 Pen registers now reach not only
information "transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached,"'2' but rather any of the specified information "transmitted by
an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication
is transmitted.' 26 Congress also eliminated the telephone limitation by
inserting "or other facility" after references to "the telephone line."' 7
Section 216 seems to explicitly incorporate the pen register limitation
suggested by the Smith Court'" by adding to the very definition of pen
register and trap and trace devices the qualification "provided, however,
that such information shall not include the contents of any communica-
tion?"' 29
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994) (amended 2001).
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Application
of the U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885
. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
123. Patriot Act § 216(c)(2)-(3), 115 Stat. at 290 [emphasis added].
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3)-(4) (1994) (amended 2001).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994) (amended 2001).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001), amended by Patriot Act § 216(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at
289. Trap and trace devices were defined to apply to wire or electronic communications. See
18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994) (amended 2001).
127. See Patriot Act §§ 216(b)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(3)(A), (c)(6), 115 Stat. at 289-90.
128. See supra Part IV.A.2. (emphasizing importance to Smith decision of fact that pen
registers disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed and not the purport of
communications, the identities of the parties, or whether the call was even completed).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2001), amended by Patriot Act § 216(c)(2)-(3), 115 Stat.
at 290.
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These amendments merely bring the statutory language into line
with actual modern practice, in which Carnivore has been employed by
the FBI as an Internet pen register on numerous occasions. Perhaps more
important from the standpoint of fighting terrorism, section 216 went on
to ease law enforcement's burden when obtaining and utilizing Carnivore
orders in two significant ways. First, Congress made pen register orders
(for any medium) issued by federal District Courts applicable "anywhere
within the United States""30 Previously, federal courts were only author-
ized to issue orders applicable within their district. 3' Second, and more
radically from the perspective of Internet Service Providers, section
216(b)(1) makes pen register orders applicable "to any person or entity
providing wire or electronic communication service in the United States
whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order.' In other
words, law enforcement personnel need not designate in advance on
which ISP's network they will install a Carnivore pen register-any are
subject to the order if a copy is served on them. If the ISP is not named
in the order, all the law enforcement official must do is "provide written
or electronic certification that the order applies to the person or entity
being served" 32
The truly revolutionary aspect of section 216 is found in its record-
keeping requirements for pen registers attached to packet-switched net-
works (like the Internet). Section 216(3)(A) requires law enforcement
agencies installing and using their own pen register or trap and trace de-
vices on a packet-switched data network of a public communication
service provider to ensure that a record is maintained which identifies:
(i) any officer or officers who installed the device and any offi-
cer or officers who accessed the device to obtain information
from the network;
(ii) the date and time the device was installed, the date and time
the device was uninstalled, and the date, time, and duration
of each time the device is accessed to obtain information;
(iii) the configuration of the device at the time of its installation
and any subsequent modification thereof; and
(iv) any information which has been collected by the device.
To the extent that the pen register or trap and trace device can be set
automatically to record this information electronically, the record shall
be maintained electronically throughout the installation and use of such
130. Patriot Act § 216(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 288.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994) (amended 2001).
132. PatriotAct § 216(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 288.
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device.133 Within 30 days of the expiration of the pen register order, this
audit record must be provided ex parte and under seal to the authorizing
court.TM
The Carnivore version reviewed by IITRI (Carnivore 1.3.4) did not
possess the ability to automatically record the required information. The
IITRI report states that it is impossible to determine which individual
agent set or changed filter settings; that the relationship between filter
settings, collected data, and other investigative activities may be difficult
to establish; that it is not possible to definitively show what settings were
used to collect any given set of data; and that the time and date stamps
placed on data are subject to error.35 In its then-current incarnation, Car-
nivore provided nothing in the way of security or accountability. As the
IITRI report put it, "since there are no checksums or other protections on
the collected data files and no individual accountability, anyone could
edit the collected data. Since all users log on as Administrator, evidence
of the changed files could be erased."' 36 In light of these revelations, and
without any public review of subsequent Carnivore versions, one may
well question just how much control section 216's audit requirements
will give courts over the use of Internet pen registers.
What the Patriot Act does not change is the low evidentiary standard
law enforcement officials must satisfy to obligate the court to issue pen
register orders. Upon an application setting out 1) the identities of the
government agent making the application and the law enforcement
agency conducting the investigation, and 2) a certification by the appli-
cant that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and
use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, the court is required
to issue an ex parte order authorizing the pen register or trap and trace
installation.' 3 The only difference is that now the court may issue an or-
der based on this scant evidentiary basis-that applies anywhere within
the United States.'38
On the whole, section 216 solidifies the place of Internet pen regis-
ters in American criminal investigations. Bringing the statutes
definitionally in line with existing practice, it eliminates questions of
Congressional intent and statutory interpretation with regard to different
communications technologies. In order to aid in the "war on terrorism'
133. Id. § 216(c)(3)(A), 115 Stat. at 290.
134. Id. § 216(c)(3)(B), 115 Stat. at 290.
135. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 4-4 to
4-5.
136. Id. at 4-5.




the statute further streamlines the process of applying for and executing
a pen register order, allowing any federal court to issue an order applica-
ble anywhere in the country to any communications provider whose
assistance is required. Moreover, the changes brought about by section
216 are permanent. Most of the provisions of Patriot Act Title f are sub-
ject to a "sunset provision" causing them to expire on December 31,
2005."' Section 216, however, is expressly exempted from the sunset
provision, meaning the changes it makes to pen register authorities are
here to stay.'
2. The War on Terrorism's Secret Weapon: Patriot Act Section 214
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) controls the use of
electronic surveillance techniques to gather foreign intelligence informa-
tion within the United States. Patriot Act § 214(a) makes an important
change to the scope of FISA's pen register and trap and trace provisions,
found in 50 U.S.C. § 1842. In defining the purposes for which a pen reg-
ister may issue under FISA, Patriot Act § 214(a)(1) replaces "for any
investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or information
concerning international terrorism"'41 with:
for any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information
not concerning a United States person or to protect against inter-
national terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided
that such investigation of a United States person is not con-
ducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution.
The most important aspect of this new language is the phrase "to
protect against international terrorism?' In the wake of September 11,
2001, these words carry a broad mandate to monitor the destinations and
origins of communications sent and received by individuals or organiza-
tions thought to have some connection with international terrorism. Even
before the criminal investigation necessary to obtain a pen register order
commences (or indeed, even if one never materializes), government offi-
cials may investigate individuals suspected to be linked in any way to
terrorism.
Prior to passage of the Patriot Act, the applicant for a FISA pen reg-
ister was required to provide information demonstrating there was reason
for believing that the communications device to which the pen register
139. Patriot Act § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295.
140. Id.
141. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(I) (Supp. 1999) (amended 2001).
142. Patriot Act § 214(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 286.
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would be attached had been or was about to be used to facilitate terrorist
activities. ' 3 Patriot Act § 214(a)(3) eliminates this requirement, reducing
the burden on officials wishing to employ an anti-terrorism pen register
to that required for ECPA pen registers-an application giving the iden-
tity of the officer seeking to use the pen register and a certification that
the information likely to be obtained is relevant to the relevant type of
investigation.'"
FISA will play a prominent role in the ongoing war against terror-
ism. Even more than the ECPA amendments, the changes to FISA
authorize broad use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. Where
criminal charges are not pending or even contemplated, FISA will serve
as the government's primary means of collecting information on sus-
pected terrorist collaborators within the United States. The changes to
FISA, however, are subject to the Patriot Act's sunset provision.15 For-
eign intelligence investigations commencing before December 31, 2005,
are an exception, and will continue under the amended FISA provi-
sions. 46
C. Implications of USA PATRIOTAct for Previous Analysis
The USA PATRIOT Act represents a quantum leap forward in bring-
ing the law of pen registers in line with contemporary practice on the
Internet. The reality of ubiquitous online communications could not long
exist without law enforcement seeking and securing investigatory powers
on the network. Indeed, they have already been exercising such powers
since at least June 2000, when Carnivore's existence was revealed to the
public. Congressional action was necessary to demarcate the extent of
those powers and to place appropriate controls on their exercise.
To that end, Congress updated the relevant statutory definitions to
include Internet pen registers within pen registers generally. This in itself
was not terribly revolutionary; courts issuing Carnivore pen register or-
ders had already assumed the statutes extended to the Internet. Congress
simply approved this assumption. As such, the criticisms of Parts
IV.B.1.-3. are now moot. The literal language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123 and
3127 have been altered to allow Carnivore pen register installations. Any
judicial interpretations suggesting the contrary based on the statute's
limitation to a telephone line are likewise superceded. While the argu-
ment in Part IV.B.3. that CALEA evidenced a congressional intent to
143. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3) (Supp. 1999) (amended 2001).
144. Patriot Act § 214(a)(3), 115 Stat. at 286.
145. Id. § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295.
146. Id.
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impose a higher standard of proof for obtaining e-mail addressing infor-
mation can no longer stand, there remains some inconsistency in
requiring law enforcement to meet a higher standard for obtaining trans-
actional logs directly from the service provider than for creating such
logs themselves.
The record keeping requirements of Patriot Act § 216(b)(3)(A) are
an encouraging sign that Congress expects courts to exercise some over-
sight of Internet pen register use. Assuming the absence of overt
alterations of the audit record, courts should use these records to insure
that the scope of the pen register order is not exceeded. As noted above,
however, technical limitations in the Carnivore program may render such
oversight illusory. The only publicly reviewed version of the software
allowed the wholesale alteration of data without producing evidence of
such alteration. One may well question whether law enforcement will
implement more conscientious record-keeping in a time of increased
public receptiveness to invasive monitoring techniques.
Despite the sweeping changes introduced by the Patriot Act, the
troubling question remains whether Carnivore collects more than is con-
stitutionally permissible for a pen register. 147 The capture of X-redacted
subject and content information appears to violate the Smith Court's re-
quirement that pen registers collect only information in which no
expectation of privacy exists (in that case, the telephone numbers dialed).
While not revealing what those contents are, the additional information
does disclose whether a communication was completed.148 Likewise, this
over-collection appears to violate the minimization requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 3121(c). As amended, it reads:
(c) Limitation. A government agency authorized to install and
use a pen register or trap and trace device under this chapter or
under State law shall use technology reasonably available to it
that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic or other im-
pulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or
electronic communications so as not to include the contents of
any wire or electronic communications.
The HTRI suggested ways in which this minimization requirement
could be met, and opined that the then-current version of Carnivore may
have failed to meet those requirements. 49 With no subsequent report to
indicate whether these recommendations were followed, it is currently
147. See supra Part IV.A.2.
148. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,741 (1979).
149. See ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at
xii, A-1.
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unknown whether Carnivore or its successors are collecting data within
constitutional and statutory boundaries. The audit records provided to
courts will shed no light on this question for the public, for even assum-
ing they are accurate, they are kept under seal by the court.
The changes implemented by Patriot Act sections 214 and 216 will
likely increase the number of pen register and trap and trace orders is-
sued for Internet communications. Section 216 permanently authorizes
Internet pen registers for criminal investigations. Section 214 temporar-
ily but sweepingly expands the permissible reasons for installing an
Internet pen register. In tandem, they open the Internet to police surveil-
lance and shatter any illusions that online communications are privileged
in any manner greater than more traditional telecommunications media.
